Water Scarcity in the Zambezi Basin in the Long-Term Future: A Risk Assessment by Hoekstra, Arjen Y.
Integrated Assessment 1389-5176/03/0403-185$16.00
2003, Vol. 4, No. 3, pp. 185–204 # Swets & Zeitlinger
Water Scarcity in the Zambezi Basin in the Long-Term Future:
A Risk Assessment
ARJEN Y. HOEKSTRA
UNESCO-IHE Institute for Water Education, Delft, The Netherlands
ABSTRACT
The aim of this paper is to explore possible futures for the Zambezi basin and to estimate the risks of different water management
strategies. Existing uncertainties are translated into alternative assumptions. The risk of a certain management strategy, which has
been developed under a given set of assumptions, is analysed by applying alternative assumptions. For the exploration of possible
futures, a dynamic simulation model is used. Three ‘utopias’ and a number of ‘dystopias’ are considered. A utopia is based on a
coherent set of assumptions with respect to world-view (how does the world function), management style (how do people respond)
and context (exogenous developments). A dystopia evolves if some assumptions are taken differently. Using the risk assessment
method described, the paper reflects on the water policy priorities earlier proposed in an expert meeting held in Harare. It is shown
that in only one out of the nine cases putting the ‘Harare priorities’ into practice will work out effectively and without large trade-
offs. It is concluded that minimising risks would require a radical shift from supply towards demand policy.
Keywords: water scarcity, simulation, risk assessment, cultural theory, Zambezi.
1. INTRODUCTION
The Zambezi basin in Southern Africa is one of the great
international river basins in the world. Eight nations have
part of their territory in the basin: Zambia, Angola,
Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Malawi, Tanzania, Namibia and
Botswana (Fig. 1). The catchment area of the Zambezi lies in
the tropics, between 9 and 20 degrees south of the equator,
and encompasses humid, semi-arid and arid regions. The
rainy season is from November to April, in the southern
summer. Annual rainfall varies between 600 mm=yr in the
southern part of the basin and 1200 mm=yr in the northern
part.
The total population in the Zambezi basin is estimated at
about 25.5 million (in 1994). The gross basin product –
defined as the sum of the gross national products insofar as
generated within the basin – is estimated at about 10 billion
US$ (in 1995). As a result, the gross basin product per capita
is about 400 US$ per capita per year. Recent growth rates
show that the population in the Zambezi basin has increased
about 1.5 times faster than gross basin product, which
implies that the average income per capita has decreased
considerably (Table 1). The total cropland area has grown at
a rate of about 10 per cent of population growth, while
irrigated cropland increased by nearly as much as the
population. In the past fifteen years the population in the
Zambezi basin grew by 60 to 70 per cent and the total
irrigated cropland area by 50 to 60 per cent.
In the past, water resources development in the Zambezi
basin has been dominated by national single-purpose
projects. These projects have rarely taken into consideration
the interests of other users or countries or the consequential
environmental impacts. Despite this lack of comprehensive
planning, there have been no major conflicts in the utilisation
of the Zambezi river system, probably due to the fact that
many parts of the basin still offer sufficient scope for further
development. However, if all current plans for such
development are realised, different interests will inevitably
begin to clash. At present, the installed hydropower
generation capacity in the main stream of the Zambezi
amounts to nearly 3500 MW, but there are plans in more
or less advanced stages of development for at least an-
other 6000 MW (Batoka Gorge 1600 MW, Devil’s Gorge
1240 MW, Mupata Gorge 1000 MW, extension Cahora
Bassa 550 MW, Mapanda Uncua 1600 MW). At the same
time there are ambitious plans throughout the basin to extend
irrigation. According to Pallett [1] more than 500,000
hectares of land could be brought under irrigation in the next
30 years. Furthermore, given continuing population growth,
an increasing level of urbanisation and an expected rise in
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average living standards, domestic water demand will
increase significantly throughout the basin. In addition,
proposals have been made to withdraw water from the
Zambezi river near Katima Mulilo in Namibia, for export to
South Africa to supply the water needs of Johannesburg,
Pretoria, and surrounding agricultural areas [2].
It is open to question whether all individual plans can go
ahead collectively. Most of the problems that might be
expected will not emerge immediately as the result of one
particular project, but rather they will develop as the long-
term net result of a combination of activities [3–6]. In the
long run, water resources development in the upstream parts
of the Zambezi basin is likely to reduce the possibilities for
downstream development. In addition, the increasing de-
mand for water throughout the basin will certainly affect its
current ecological functioning.
The aim of this paper is to explore the full range of possible
long-term futures for the Zambezi basin and to estimate the
risks of different water management strategies. The year 2050
will be taken as a time horizon. The approach followed fits in
the tradition of model-based scenario development, which
started in the sixties. The paper particularly aims to contribute
to the development of methodology to deal with structural
uncertainties inherent to complex systems.
The paper is composed as follows. The next section
describes the method for risk assessment in long-term
planning that has been applied. The third section briefly
describes the simulation model that has been used. In the
fourth section, three ‘water utopias’ are presented, according
to three different ‘perspectives’: the hierarchist, egalitarian
and individualist. A utopia is characterised by a coherent set
of assumptions with regard to world-view, management style
Table 1. Average annual growth rates (%=yr).
Period Angola Namibia Botswana Zambia Zimbabwe Tanzania Malawi Mozamb. Zambezi basinc
Populationa 1980–1994 3.1 2.7 3.4 3.4 3.2 3.2 4.1 1.8 3.4
Gross national productb 1980–1991 n.a. 1.6 9.3 0.7 3.6 2.0 3.5 1.1 2.3
Total cropland areaa 1980–1994 0.21 0.05 0.35 0.23 0.83 1.5 1.8 0.23 0.36
Irrigated cropland areaa 1980–1994 0.0 2.9 0.0 6.5 2.8 1.6 3.2 3.6 3.0
Note. aCalculated on the basis of data from [22].
b[21].
cData for the Zambezi basin have been calculated on the basis of the national data, weighted according to the relative contribution of a
nation to the total population (respectively gross national product, total cropland area, irrigated cropland area) in the Zambezi basin.
Fig. 1. Map of the Zambezi basin.
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and exogenous developments. The fifth section discusses a
number of different dystopian futures, which will evolve if
alternative assumptions are made. These dystopias give
some insight into the risks associated with each of the
utopias. The sixth section reflects on the water policy
priorities proposed by the participants of a workshop in
Harare in 1996, discussing the kinds of risk that will emerge
if these priorities are put into practice. The last section of the
paper provides some suggestions for policy priorities that
may reduce the various types of risk.
2. A METHOD FOR RISK ASSESSMENT
IN LONG-TERM PLANNING
Long-term planners have to cope with large uncertainties.
How fast will populations grow, and what type of economic
development might be expected? How will consumption
patterns change, and how will people respond to changes in
prices? Efforts to increase knowledge might reduce uncer-
tainties to some extent, but research often makes people aware
of new uncertainties at the same time. In general, it has
appeared that it is relatively easy to reduce uncertainties if one
considers a particular phenomenon in isolation, but this
becomes much more difficult if the interaction between a large
variety of phenomena comes into play. Planning on the long-
term typically involves the latter type of situation.
In order to assess risks involved in long-term planning, a
six-step approach has been followed [7–9]:
1. identification of the major uncertainties in the field
considered,
2. analysis of the consistency or inconsistency between
different alternative assumptions,
3. qualitative description of a limited number of ‘perspec-
tives’ (coherent sets of assumptions),
4. mathematical formalisation of the set of assumptions for
each perspective,
5. development of scenarios by varying (sub-sets of)
assumptions,
6. risk assessment of a certain management strategy by
varying the other assumptions.
The first step is to identify the major uncertainties that have to
be handled. A practical way to do so is to look at controversies
that exist between experts in the field. Controversies often
betray the presence of uncertainties about the basic assump-
tions or hypotheses to be adopted. Major uncertainties can refer
to unknown parameter values, but to the very nature of cause-
effect relations as well. The outcome of this step depends
largely on the type of policy questions to be answered. In long-
term planning, ‘structural’ uncertainties deserve particular
attention, because the existence of alternatives for a cause-
effect mechanism will generally affect the outcome of the
analysis to a larger extent than the existence of an uncertainty
range for some parameter value. A structural uncertainty in the
field of water resources planning is for instance: does
increasing prosperity result in improved water supply and
sanitation conditions or should one presume a reverse mecha-
nism, in which improved water supply and sanitation are a
precondition for improved health and economic development?
The first mechanism means that investments in the economy
will indirectly, but automatically, benefit water supply and
sanitation conditions. If one evaluates the effectiveness of
different investment strategies on the basis of this presupposi-
tion, one has built in a bias in favour of investments in the
economy. On the other hand, presupposing the second
mechanism will work out in favour of direct investments in
water supply and sanitation infrastructure. Another example
regards the causal relation between economic growth and
environmental pollution. Some people hypothesise that eco-
nomic growth is needed to pay measures against environmen-
tal pollution, while others hold that economic growth is the
primary cause of pollution and should therefore be tempered.
Thus one can see that there is a strong relation between the
assumptions and the outcome of the analysis, which shows that
clarifying the assumptions and analysing the implications of
alternative assumptions is very important.
The second step is to analyse the consistency between
different assumptions. Some assumptions can logically be
combined, others cannot. For instance, regarding water
demand as a given need (that depends on population
numbers, food demand, etc.) fits with the conception of
water demand as rather unmanageable (e.g., insensitive to
price changes) and the idea that advanced technology and
supply infrastructure are required to meet increasing
demands and prevent water shortages. Another logical
combination is to regard water as an economic good, water
demand as primarily price-driven and market pricing as the
proper way to reduce water scarcity. A combination of
assumptions that is not consistent, for instance, is to regard
water demand as a given need and to assume that market
pricing reduces water shortages. One can distinguish two
levels to evaluate whether assumptions logically combine or
not. At the first level, one can look whether assumptions
depend on each other in reality and at the second level one
can look whether they depend on each other in people’s
minds. It probably needs no explanation that assumptions
should at least be logically consistent at the first level. For
instance, it does not make sense to estimate a certain natural
constant ‘high’ in one part of the study area and ‘low’ in
another part, at least not if one claims the natural constant to
be a natural constant! Let us consider, however, the second
level. It can happen that assumptions do not depend on each
other at the first, physical level, but that they do at the second
level, in people’s minds. For instance, people who are very
much concerned with environmental issues tend to assume
conservative estimates for the purification capacity of rivers
and a high vulnerability of rare species to pollution. At the
same time they have low expectations of new technology, so
they assume low rates for or even neglect technological
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development. It is questionable whether parameters such as
‘purification rate’, ‘vulnerability of a species to environ-
mental change’ and ‘technological development rate’ really
depend on each other, in physical sense, but people surely
behave as if they were dependent. In order to simulate
human behaviour, it makes sense to build scenarios on the
basis of sets of assumptions that fit with one another not only
at the first but also at the second level.
The third step is to describe different perspectives. A
perspective is here defined as a coherent perception (set of
assumptions and hypotheses) with regard to the functioning of
the world and the way people act. Social scientists have shown
that people handle uncertainties in different ways, according
to their own ‘perspective’ (e.g., [10]). In this study, it has been
chosen to use the four perspectives described in the cultural
theory of Thompson et al. [11]: the hierarchist, egalitarian,
individualist and fatalist. Current uncertainties and contro-
versies in the water research field have been interpreted in
terms of these four perspectives. According to the hierarchist
for instance, water demand is a given need, so the way to solve
water scarcity is to increase supply. The hierarchist is often
described as the engineer, the bureaucrat or the technocrat.
From the egalitarian point of view, the driving force behind
water scarcity is the growing demand, so solutions should be
found in demand management (the view of environmental-
ists). According to the individualist, the only right indicator of
water scarcity is or should be the price of water. The solution
to water scarcity would then be to introduce proper pricing
mechanisms. According to the fatalist, uncertainties are so
large that it is difficult to say whether one type of policy would
be more beneficial than another one, so the basic attitude is to
await the things to come.
The fourth step is to formalise the different assumptions and
hypotheses for each perspective. The aim of this step is to arrive
at a number of different analytical models, each one repre-
senting one particular perspective. However, the different
analytical models are placed within one framework, so that one
can easily switch one particular assumption or the whole set of
assumptions to another perspective. An assumption can refer to
either a particular quantity (e.g., the value of a parameter) or a
certain relationship (e.g., the form of an equation). The whole
set of assumptions is grouped into three categories:
 assumptions with regard to the autonomous behaviour of
the system considered (world-view),
 assumptions about how the system is or should be
managed (management style), and
 assumptions referring to the exogenous developments that
are input to the model, such as demographic developments
and economic growth (context).
Table 2. Basic characteristics of the four perspectives on water [8, 9].
Hierarchist Egalitarian Individualist Fatalist
Water demand A given need A manageable desire Price-driven An unmanageable
desire
Water-conserving
technology
Large-scale technology
push
Small-scale technology
push
Price-driven No policy
Water price policy Incremental price increase Water taxing Market pricing No policy
Water availability Stable runoff Stable runoff in inhabited
areas
Total runoff or
no limits
Irrelevant to
individuals
Water scarcity Supply problem Demand problem Market problem Problem of individuals
Water allocation Based on priorities Water allocation should be
equitable and
environmentally
sustainable
Markets care
for efficient
allocation
First come
first served
Groundwater use Inevitable Below sustainable level Desirable if
cost-effective
Profitable to a few
Artificial groundwater
recharge
Solution to water scarcity Should not be necessary Desirable if
cost-effective
No policy
Artificial surface
reservoirs
Solution to water scarcity Undesirable Desirable if
cost-effective
No policy
Water trade Controlled trade No water trade Free trade Trade is for the rich
Food security policy Food self-reliance Food self-sufficiency Free trade No policy
Hydrological system Robust within limits Vulnerable to
perturbations
Robust Unpredictable
Public water supply Incremental improvements Basic supply to everyone Driven by economic
growth
Given to the rich
Water quality evaluation Functional quality standards Pristine quality as reference Economic value No reference
Wastewater policy Treatment to meet
standards
Decrease production and
treat residuals
‘Polluters pay’
principle
No policy
Flooding policy Protection through dikes,
divergent risk levels
Give room to and live
with natural processes
Economic evaluation
of options
Risk acceptance
188 ARJEN Y. HOEKSTRA
Part of step four is to calibrate the model separately for each
of the world-views, on the basis of historical data for
management and context. If one can obtain acceptable
calibration results for each of the world-views, historical
developments can apparently be explained according to
alternative points of view. This is of course a precondition
for applying the world-views for exploring the future.
In the fifth step, perspective-based scenarios are devel-
oped. Before running the model one can choose a certain
context, world-view and management style. The manage-
ment style can be chosen according to one of the four
perspectives. The context and world-view can be chosen
according to the hierarchist, egalitarian or the individual-
ist perspective only (the fatalist regards the world as
unpredictable: the future might randomly behave like one
of the other perspectives). Scenarios are constructed by
choosing a certain combination of context, world-view and
management style. In this way, one arrives at 334¼ 36
possible futures. Three of these futures are called utopias,
‘ideal’ futures in which context, world-view and manage-
ment style correspond to the same perspective. Dystopias are
scenarios in which this is not the case.
In the sixth and last step, the risks of different policy
strategies are estimated by analysing the dystopian futures:
what happens if a certain management style, which corre-
sponds to one particular perspective, is applied in a world
which appears to behave according to another perspective. In
this way, the risk concept is not defined from one particular
perspective, but is understood at a level that exceeds the
individual perspectives. Such a risk assessment can support
the formulation of policy priorities that go beyond the
preferences of separate perspectives. It can for instance
provide the information that is necessary if one would like to
put the ‘precautionary principle’ into practice. This principle
says that high risks should be avoided as much as possible,
even if that would mean that a preferred management strategy
should be abandoned. The basic idea behind the precautionary
principle is that the ‘best strategy’ under some specific
assumptions might be one of the worst under other as-
sumptions. A more robust strategy would therefore be one that
works out ‘good’ under some assumptions and ‘sufficiently’
(or not too bad) under other assumptions.
For the results of the first three steps, the reader is referred
to [8, 9]. As a summary, Table 2 gives the basic char-
acteristics of the four perspectives on water. The current
paper focuses on the final three steps. Section 3 addresses the
fourth step (modelling); Sections 4 and 5 address the fifth
step (construction of scenarios); and Sections 6 and 7
address the sixth step (risk assessment).
3. THE AQUA ZAMBEZI MODEL
AQUA is a tool for integrated water assessment, particularly
designed for the analysis of the interaction between long-
term socio-economic development and changes in the water
system [8, 12]. It is an explorative tool, meant for the
examination of the implications of varying assumptions and
hypotheses. The AQUA Zambezi Model is a particular
application of the AQUA tool. This section gives a concise
description of the AQUA Zambezi Model.
3.1. Schematisation of the System
In order to structure the various elements within the overall
system, four sub-systems are distinguished: pressure, state,
impact and response. The pressure system refers to a variety of
processes that affect the state of the water system. The state
system refers to water stocks, flows and water quality. The
impact system refers to the performance of human activities
that depend on water and the functioning of ecosystems. The
response system refers to human action that is undertaken in
reaction to certain impacts. If put in relation to each other, the
four sub-systems form a closed causal loop, because response
feeds back to pressure, state and impact. Corresponding to this
schematisation, the AQUA model consists of four interacting
sub-models.
The year 1990 has been chosen as the initial year of
simulation. The year 2050 has been chosen as the time
horizon. For the description of pressure, impact and response
processes, the basin has been schematised into eight socio-
economic regions, corresponding to the national territories
that constitute the basin. For the description of hydrological
processes and water quality (the state system), the Zambezi
basin has been schematised into eight sub-basins: Upper
Zambezi, Barotse, Cuando-Chobe, Middle Zambezi, Kafue,
Luangwa, Lake Malawi – Shire, and Lower Zambezi (Fig. 2).
The Zambezi rises in the Upper Zambezi basin and flows via
the Barotse, Middle Zambezi and Lower Zambezi basins
towards the Indian Ocean (Fig. 3). The Cuando-Chobe basin
connects to the Middle Zambezi basin at the Chobe
confluence, just upstream of Victoria Falls. The Kafue,
Luangwa and Lake Malawi – Shire basins drain into the
Lower Zambezi basin. Table 3 shows the extent to which the
national territories lie within the different sub-basins.
The pressures on the Zambezi water system per country
are translated into pressures per sub-basin in order to
calculate changes in the state of the water system for each
sub-basin. The changes per sub-basin are then translated
back into changes per country, so that impacts and societal
response can be calculated for each country. The calcula-
tions in the pressure, impact and response models are made
only for those parts of the national territories that lie within
the Zambezi basin.
3.2. The Pressure Sub-Model
The pressure sub-model calculates water demand from
determinants such as population size, gross national product,
value added in the industrial sector and demand for irrigated
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cropland. The model distinguishes four water-demanding
sectors: the domestic, irrigation, livestock, and industrial
sector. In addition, water export to South Africa is
considered. Domestic water demand is split up into urban
and rural demand, and in both cases into public and private
demand. Within the livestock sector, a distinction is made
between cattle and an aggregate category of sheep, goats and
pigs. As water sources, the model distinguishes between
surface and groundwater. In addition to water withdrawals,
the pressure model calculates consumptive water use (the
part of the withdrawal that gets lost through evaporation),
wastewater production and wastewater treatment.
For the livestock sector, specific demand is supposed to
remain constant. For each of the other sectors, specific
 
 
  
  
 
Fig. 3. River flow schematisation in the AQUA Zambezi Model.
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Model structure of the AQUA Zambezi Model.
190 ARJEN Y. HOEKSTRA
water demand WDspec in kg=yr is calculated as:
dWDspecðtÞ
dt
¼ ElGðtÞ  dGNPpcðtÞ=dt
GNPpcðtÞ þ ElP

 dWPðtÞ=dt
WPðtÞ 
dEffactðtÞ=dt
Eff actðtÞ

WDspecðtÞ
ð1Þ
in which GNPpc represents gross national product per capita,
WP the water price and Effact the actual water-use efficiency.
The (sector-specific) growth elasticity ElG has a positive
value and is defined as a function of GNPpc (it is assumed
that the response of demand to economic growth will
decrease if a certain stage of development has been reached).
The price elasticity ElP has a negative value. Efficiency
improvements are driven by technological innovation and
increased public awareness of the environmental impacts of
excessive water use. A simple logistic curve with a diffusion
rate d has been assumed, to simulate the diffusion of water-
conserving technology:
dEffactðtÞ
dt
¼ d  EffactðtÞ  ðEffmaxðtÞ  EffactðtÞÞ ð2Þ
The maximum possible efficiency value Effmax determines the
ceiling of the logistic curve. In the case of irrigation,
efficiency is defined as the fraction of the total water
withdrawal that actually benefits the crop (i.e., the part taken
up and transpired by the plant). The remainder consists of
water losses through evaporation and groundwater recharge.
The maximum possible efficiency in the case of irrigation has
a natural upper limit of 100 per cent. In the case of domestic
and industrial water use, efficiency is a relative concept,
which means that an efficiency value has meaning only if
compared to a previous efficiency value. The development of
Effmax is here considered to be an input scenario:
dEffmaxðtÞ
dt
¼ TD ð3Þ
in which TD is a measure of technical development in yr1
with a value greater than or equal to zero.
3.3. The State Sub-Model
The state model describes hydrological processes and
freshwater quality. The hydrological cycle is modelled by
distinguishing three dynamic water stores (soil moisture,
groundwater and surface water) and by simulating the flows
between these stores. This yields estimates of evapotran-
spiration, net precipitation, direct runoff and percolation,
delayed runoff, and total river runoff. For calculating
evaporation and runoff, five land-cover types are distin-
guished: forest, grassland, rain-fed and irrigated cropland,
and open water. Water quality is described in terms of four
water quality variables (nitrate, ammonium, dissolved
organic nitrogen and phosphate) and four quality classes
(good, adequate, inadequate, and poor). Good means
suitable for the maintenance of natural aquatic ecosystems.
Water of adequate quality does not meet natural conditions
but is suitable for most human purposes. Inadequate means
unsuitable for both natural aquatic ecosystems and drinking,
and poor means unsuitable also for agricultural and
industrial purposes.
Potential evaporation is calculated on a monthly basis,
using the empirical relations of Thornthwaite [13]. Actual
evaporation and soil moisture dynamics are calculated
according to [14]. Net precipitation is divided into two
fractions: direct runoff and percolation. Both the ground-
water and the surface water store are modelled as linear
reservoirs, which means that outflow linearly relates to
storage. Each water store is represented by a mass balance:
dSðtÞ
dt
¼
X
FinðtÞ 
X
FoutðtÞ ð4Þ
in which S is the storage in kg,
P
Fin the sum of the inflows
and
P
Fout the sum of the outflows.
3.4. The Impact Sub-Model
The impact model calculates actual water supply to house-
holds, irrigated lands, livestock and industry as a function of
demand and actual allocation. On the basis of water use and
Table 3. Spatial schematisation of the Zambezi basin (areas in 109 m2).
Sub-basin Angola Namibia Botswana Zambia Zimbabwe Tanzania Malawi Mozambique Total
Upper Zambezi 109 – – 96 – – – – 205
Barotse 37 – – 115 – – – – 152
Cuando-Chobe 92 16 12 15 – – – – 135
Middle Zambezi – – – 31 135 – – – 166
Kafue – – – 158 – – – – 158
Luangwa – – – 147 – – – 4 151
Lake Malawi – Shire – – – – – 27 107 21 155
Lower Zambezi – – – 20 80 – – 138 238
Total 238 16 12 582 215 27 107 163 1360
Source: sub-basin boundaries have been taken from [36] and country boundaries from [37].
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water availability, the model calculates water scarcity (on a
scale between zero and hundred per cent). Water costs per
litre are calculated per sector on the basis of water scarcity
and water quality. Hydroelectric power generation is
calculated as a function of the generation capacity and
the utilisation fraction, the latter depending on the river
runoff.
The water availability in a region is divided into two
components: internal and external sources. The first refers to
the available amount of water due to precipitation within the
region. The second consists of the water flow entering
the region from upstream. Where the Zambezi river forms
the border between two countries (first between Zambia and
Namibia and, further downstream, between Zambia and
Zimbabwe), it has been assumed that both riparian countries
have access to the entire river flow. (This does not mean that
they have the right to use it all.) No external sources have
been assumed for the Zambezi basin territories of Angola,
Botswana, Zambia, Tanzania and Malawi. The external
water source of the Namibian territory has been defined as
the runoff from the Barotse basin (which is generated in
Angola and Zambia). The external water sources of
Zimbabwe are formed by the runoff from the Barotse and
Kafue basins. The latter fully originates in Zambia, but is
available to Zimbabwe after the Kafue has joined the
Zambezi. Theoretically, Zimbabwe can also draw on the
runoff from the Cuando-Chobe basin, but this flow is
generally negligible. The external sources of Mozambique
consist of the runoff from the Middle Zambezi basin
(which is generated mainly in Angola, Zambia and
Zimbabwe), the runoff from the Kafue and Luangwa
basins (generated in Zambia), and the runoff from the Lake
Malawi – Shire basin (descending mainly from Malawi and
Tanzania).
3.5. The Response Sub-Model
The annual expenditure required to meet a certain water
demand is calculated as the product of the demand and the
costs per litre. Expenditure needs are calculated separately for
the domestic, irrigation, livestock and industrial sectors. In a
similar way, the model calculates required expenditure for
sanitation, hydropower, and domestic and industrial waste-
water treatment. Actual expenditures are a function of
required expenditures and actual allocation of means. The
response model includes a number of policy variables – in
the form of ‘manageable’ parameters – that can be changed by
the user of the model. The maximum expenditure for a certain
sector, expressed as a fraction of the gross national product, is
such a policy variable. Other policy variables in the model are:
the technological development rate (representing the effect of
research and development programmes), the diffusion rate
(representing the effect of public awareness raising), the ratio
between water prices and actual costs (water pricing policy),
and export of water to another river basin.
3.6. Input Data
Data on water stocks in lakes, reservoirs and wetlands have
been derived mainly from [15]. Water stocks in rivers have
been estimated per sub-basin on the basis of river runoff,
stream velocity and river length, using data from [16].
Population data for the initial year 1990 have been derived
from the population density map of Deichman [17]. The
populations of the basin states have been assumed to grow
according to either the low, medium or high scenarios of the
United Nations [18]. Country data on the ratio between rural
and urban populations have been taken from [19]. It has been
assumed that the urbanisation level over the whole basin will
increase according to the same trend as has been noticed in
developed countries (see [20]). The following initial values
of specific domestic water demand are used: 150 kg=day per
capita for public water supply in urban areas, and 25 kg=day
for public water supply in rural areas and for private water
supply in both rural and urban areas. Although the author is
aware that there are considerable spatial differences, these
figures have been adopted for all countries. As argued in [8]
the regional specific data available have very low reliability.
Initial data for public water supply coverage and sanitation
coverage have been taken from [21].
National livestock figures for the initial year 1990 have
been taken from [22]. Growth rates for livestock have been
assumed to be equal to the population growth rates. Specific
water demand for cattle has been assumed to be constant at
33 kg=day per head. The specific water demand for sheep,
goats and pigs has been assumed to be eight times less.
Initial land cover data have been derived from the digital
land cover map of Olson et al. [23] supplemented by data
from [22]. The areas of irrigated cropland have primarily
been derived from [22]. It has been assumed that the total
area of cropland in each country extends at a rate between
0.3 and 0.6 per cent per year – at the expense of forests and
grasslands. The areas of irrigated land have been assumed to
increase between 2 and 4.5 per cent per year. Initial irri-
gation water demand has been assumed at 10106 kg=yr per
hectare for all countries.
Data for the gross national products in 1990 have been
taken from [24]. National data on the value added of the
industrial sector have been taken from [25]. Economic
growth rates have been assumed to vary between 2 and 4 per
cent a year. For all countries, specific industrial water
demand has been assumed 70 kg=yr per US$ value added in
the industrial sector, a value corresponding to the global
average at the beginning of the 20th century. Data on
hydropower generation capacity in the Zambezi basin have
been taken from [26].
Data on the relative use of surface water and groundwater
have been taken from [19, 27, 28]. Due to a lack of data,
wastewater treatment coverage in 1990 has been assumed to
be 5 per cent throughout the river basin, for both domestic
and industrial wastewater. Water supply – cost curves have
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been assumed based on a case study for Zimbabwe’s section
of the Zambezi basin, using data from [29]. Further it has
been assumed that 25 per cent of the actual costs are charged
to the consumer, a rough estimate taken from [30].
River runoff has been calibrated separately for each of the
eight sub-basins distinguished (see [8]). The calibration was
carried out for an ‘average’ year with respect to climatic
conditions and under water-use conditions in the year 1990.
Monthly precipitation and temperature data per sub-basin
and land cover type have been derived from [31]. Monthly
river runoff data for different hydrometric stations were
derived from [32].
3.7. Representation of the Four Perspectives
The model has been built in such a way that the user can
apply different perspectives on how the system behaves
(world-views), on how the system is or should be managed
(management styles) and on how external factors will
develop (contexts). For that purpose, different perspective-
based model formulations and different input values are
available (Table 4).
The assumptions with respect to exogenous developments
can be varied according to three coherent ‘contexts’ – the
hierarchist, egalitarian and individualist context. The
Table 4. Basic assumptions per perspective.
Hierarchist Egalitarian Individualist Fatalist
Socio-economic context
Gross national producta Growth rate 3.0% yr1 Growth rate 2.0% yr1 Growth rate 4.0% yr1 –
Populationb UN medium scenario UN low scenario UN high scenario –
Total cropland areaa Growth rate 0.4% yr1 Growth rate 0.3% yr1 Growth rate 0.6% yr1 –
Irrigated cropland areaa Growth rate 3.0% yr1 Growth rate 2.0% yr1 Growth rate 4.5% yr1 –
New hydropower plants Extension Cahora Bassa,
construction of Batoka
No new large dams Extension Cahora Bassa,
construction of Batoka
–
World-view
Driving forces
water demand
GNP, technology GNP, water price,
technology
GNP, water price –
Measure of water
availability
Stable runoff Stable runoff Total runoff –
Measure of water scarcity Consumptive water
use=stable runoff
Total water supply=stable
runoff
Consumptive water
use=total runoff
–
Growth elasticities,
water demandc
Medium Low High –
Price elasticities
water demandc
Zero Low High –
Fractions consumptive
water usec
Medium High Low –
Water supply costsd Increase moderately Increase rapidly Increase slowly –
Management style
Water export to
South Africa
After 2015: 1.51012 kg=yr No export After 2015: 31012 kg=yr No export
Technological diffusion
ratec,e
High Low Zero Zero
Technological
development ratec,e
High Low Zero Zero
Percentage water
price=actual cost
Growing towards
75% in 2025
Growing towards
110% in 2025
Growing towards
100% in 2025
Ratio remains
constant
Public water
supply coverage
Growing towards
100% in 2050
Growing towards
100% in 2025
Depending on
economic growth
Coverage remains
constant
Sanitation coverage Growing towards
100% in 2050
Growing towards
100% in 2025
Depending on
economic growth
Coverage remains
constant
Fraction of
wastewater treated
Growing towards
100% in 2050
Growing towards
100% in 2050
Depending on
economic growth
Coverage remains
constant
Note. aGrowth rates have been assumed equal for all countries within the basin and for the entire simulation period. In reality, it is likely
that growth rates will fluctuate over the years and differ in the countries. However, it is assumed here that the average growth rates in
the long term will be distributed quite uniformly over the basin states.
bThe UN scenarios provide country specific data up to 2025 [18]; for the period 2025–2050, the 2025 growth rates have been
assumed.
cThe exact figures are given in [8].
dCost curves differ per water-use sector, quality of the intake water and region.
eThese parameters refer to (non-price driven) improvements in water-use efficiency.
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hierarchist context is largely an extrapolation of the recent
trends shown in Table 1. The egalitarian context is
characterised by more modest growth rates. The individu-
alist context represents a future of rapid economic growth.
The assumptions with respect to the functioning of the
system considered can be varied according to three ‘world-
views’ – the hierarchist, egalitarian and individualist world-
view. Each world-view consists of a specific set of equations
and initial and parameter values, representing a coherent
perception of how the world works.
The assumptions with respect to the response behaviour
of people can be varied according to four pre-defined
management styles – the hierarchist, egalitarian, individu-
alist and fatalist management style. Each management style
consists of a particular set of parameter values representing a
certain policy strategy. Once a pre-defined management style
has been chosen, the user of the model can adjust particular
elements if preferred. The user of the model can get an
insight into the risks of a particular management style by
varying the world-view and context while keeping the
management style constant.
4. THREE UTOPIAS
4.1. The Hierarchist Water Utopia
The hierarchist utopia will evolve within the hierarchist
context, assuming that the world functions according to the
hierarchist world-view and that a hierarchist management
style is adopted. An important assumption behind the
hierarchist water utopia is that the economies of the Zambezi
countries will show moderate growth during the 21st
century, slightly higher than during the past fifteen years.
The population will continue to increase, but growth rates
will decline according to the medium population scenario of
the United Nations. Average gross basin product per capita
will grow slowly to 450 US$=yr in 2050. The annual growth
rates of total and irrigated cropland have been assumed to
equal the average growth rates of the past fifteen years. In
accordance with current plans, a new dam and hydropower
plant will be build at Batoka Gorge (with an installed
capacity of 1600 MW) and the present hydropower genera-
tion capacity at Cahora Bassa will be extended from 2075 to
2625 MW. Occasional problems of flooding in the basin will
be reduced due to enlarged regulating capacity. Starting in
the year 2015, water from the Zambezi will be exported to
South Africa. The diverting point will be at Katima Mulilo in
Namibia and the volume of export will be 1.51012 kg=yr,
half of what can be withdrawn without having to provide
storage in the Zambezi river [2, 5].
Under these conditions, total water supply in the Zambezi
basin will grow by a factor of about 7.5 in the period 1990–
2050 (Fig. 4). In 2050, water export will constitute 11 per
cent of the total water withdrawal in the basin and 21 per
cent of the consumptive water use. The irrigation sector will
remain the largest water user, both in terms of total
Fig. 4. Sector water supplies in the Zambezi basin in each of the three utopias. Water export from the Zambezi basin to South Africa is
regarded as a separate sector.
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withdrawal and in terms of consumptive water use. Water
supply for irrigation will increase slightly less than the area
of irrigated land, because the average water application
factor per hectare will decrease by about 6 per cent, due to
the introduction of more efficient irrigation techniques. The
domestic sector will remain the second largest water user.
The relative growth of water use in this sector will be greater
than in the irrigation, livestock and industrial sectors,
because not only will the population grow, but so will
average water demand per capita, as a result of increasing
prosperity, urbanisation and public water supply coverage.
The most dominant factor after population growth will be
urbanisation, resulting in an increase in domestic water use
of about 40 per cent.
Within the hierarchist world-view, water scarcity is
defined as the ratio of consumptive water use to water
availability. The latter is assumed to be equal to stable
runoff. Applying these definitions, water scarcity in the
Zambezi basin will grow from 2 per cent in 1990 to 15 per
cent in 2050. Water scarcity will be highest in Malawi,
largely because of the high population density, which will
reach 440 people per (km)2 of land in 2050, greater than the
present densities in countries such as India or Japan and
nearly as high as the current density in the Netherlands.
Water scarcity in Malawi will grow from 4.4 per cent in 1990
to 27 per cent in 2050 (Fig. 5). This means that serious water
supply problems could occur in several parts of the country,
probably mainly in urban areas such as Lilongwe, Blantyre,
Mzuzu and Zomba. From a hierarchist point of view, the
ultimate solution to Malawi’s water scarcity problems of the
future is to rely on water supply from Lake Malawi. After
Malawi, greatest water scarcity will occur in the parts of the
Zambezi basin in Zambia, Zimbabwe and Mozambique. As
an example, Figure 5 shows total water supply, consumptive
water use and water availability in Zimbabwe’s section of
the basin. There are two important reasons why water
scarcity in Zimbabwe’s part of the basin will remain much
lower than in Malawi. The first is that the population density
will continue to be lower, with about 110 people per (km)2 in
2050, the second is the availability of external water sources.
The external water sources of Zimbabwe are formed by the
runoff from the Barotse and Kafue basins. However, it has to
be realised that, as can be seen in the figure, the water
availability from external sources will decrease as a
consequence of increased water use upstream, the most
severe effect coming from the withdrawal of water at Katima
Mulilo for export to South Africa.
In the hierarchist utopia water supply costs in the
Zambezi basin will grow by a factor of nearly 2, due to
increased water scarcity (Fig. 6). The average price of water
will increase much more than the costs, because the fraction
of the total costs charged to the consumer will go up from
about 25 to 75 per cent. Expenditure in the water sector,
expressed as a fraction of gross basin product, will grow
 
Fig. 5. Total water supply and consumptive water use compared to water availability in two specific regions of the Zambezi basin, in the
hierarchist utopia. In the case of Zimbabwe, water availability consists of an internal and an external component. In the case of
Malawi, water availability depends entirely on internal sources.
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from about 8% in 1990 to about 17% in 2050. The largest
part of the total expenditure goes to public water supply,
sanitation and irrigation. Smaller fractions go to livestock
water supply, industrial water supply and wastewater
treatment. Despite the still large investment in wastewater
treatment, resulting in extended treatment coverage, water
quality will decrease slightly during the first quarter of the
21st century, due to the increase in total wastewater
production. However, during the second quarter of the
century the effect of growing treatment coverage will
become greater than the effect of increased wastewater
production, resulting in an improvement in water quality.
This is shown for the Lake Malawi – Shire basin in Figure 7.
The improved water quality tempers the increase of costs to
some extent.
The hierarchist utopia can best be characterised as a
world balanced between the desirable (high growth) and the
possible (limited availability of resources). The demand for
water will increase rapidly, as in the individualist utopia, but
water availability is clearly limited, as it is in the egalitarian
utopia. As a result, water will become scarcer in the
hierarchist utopia than in the other two utopias. High-tech
infrastructure is needed to supply the water requirements of
each sector of society. In the year 2050, urban water supply
in Bulawayo, Zimbabwe, will for instance depend largely on
water from Lake Kariba, about 350 kilometres to the north of
the city. Lake Kariba might in fact be regarded as the
ultimate source of water for a large part of Zimbabwe (see
also [5]). The same will apply to Lake Malawi for Malawi.
4.2. The Egalitarian Water Utopia
The egalitarian utopia is a future with a relatively slow
increase in population, accompanied by relatively low
economic growth. The most basic difference with the
hierarchist utopia is that egalitarians prefer not to balance
on the edge of the maximum possible, but rather to stay on a
comfortable level below this maximum and strive for
stabilisation. This means that priority is given to water
demand policy over water supply policy. Instead of building
new large dams, governments will stimulate more efficient
water-use. With regard to water supply, the main concern in
the egalitarian utopia is to increase the number of people
with proper water supply and sanitation, because an
estimated 10 million people in the Zambezi basin presently
lack access to such facilities, i.e., about 40 per cent of the
entire population of the basin. Improving water supply and
sanitation conditions is expected to raise living standards
Fig. 6. Average water costs and prices in the Zambezi basin. In all possible futures, water costs will increase as a result of increasing water
scarcity. In the hierarchist and individualist utopias the effect of water export can be seen in the sharp increase in costs in the year
2015. In the three utopias, water prices will increase most strongly during the first quarter of the 21st century, due to active pricing
policies. In the three dystopias, costs not only rise as a result of increased scarcity but also as a result of decreased water quality. In
the dystopias active pricing policies are lacking, which keeps prices low but results in less efficient water use and higher water
demand.
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and reduce the number of people affected by waterborne
diseases. In the egalitarian utopia, high investment in public
water supply and sanitation aims to attain full coverage by
the year 2025.
Total water supply in the Zambezi basin will grow much
less than in the hierarchist utopia (Fig. 4), partly because of
the absence of water export to South Africa. Contrary to the
hierarchist utopia, people generally obtain their water from
nearby sources, which is possible because water demand is
much smaller and a relatively high level of water self-
sufficiency can be maintained. Occasional floods will con-
tinue to occur.
Within the egalitarian world-view, water scarcity is
defined as the ratio of total water supply to water availability,
the latter being equal to stable runoff. Using this definition,
water scarcity in the Zambezi basin will grow from 4 per
cent in 1990 to 13 per cent in 2050. As a result of the
increasing scarcity, water supply costs will increase, but less
so than in the hierarchist utopia (Fig. 6). However, water
prices will increase much more than in the hierarchist utopia,
due to the strong pricing policy introduced, including a water
tax of 10 per cent of actual costs. This policy is partly
responsible also for the only modest increase in total water
demand. Expenditure in the water sector will be much less
than in the hierarchist utopia, even if expressed as a fraction
of gross basin product. Total expenditure in the water sector
will grow from about 8% of the gross basin product in 1990
to about 15% in 2050.
4.3. The Individualist Water Utopia
The individualist utopia is a future of rapid growth (Table 4).
In the period 1990–2050, gross basin product per capita
more than doubles, resulting in improved water supply and
sanitation conditions. Due to the favourable economic
conditions, there is room for high investment in advanced
water supply infrastructure, water re-use techniques and
wastewater treatment, all more than in the hierarchist and
egalitarian utopias. However, the need for high investment in
the individualist utopia is also greater than in the other
utopias, as a result of relatively high water demand and
wastewater production. Especially water supply for irriga-
tion will be much more extensive than in the other two
utopias (Fig. 4). Furthermore, it is assumed that the SADC
countries will achieve agreement on exporting water from
the Zambezi to South Africa. As in the hierarchist utopia, the
water will be diverted at Katima Mulilo, starting in 2015, but
the volume of export is assumed to be 31012 kg=yr, twice as
large as in the hierarchist utopia. This is the quantity that can
be diverted without having to provide storage in the Zambezi.
 
 
 
 
Fig. 7. Surface water quality in the Lake Malawi – Shire basin in the hierarchist utopia and dystopia. In the dystopia, an increasing volume
of untreated wastewater will cause severe pollution problems. Such problems are prevented in the utopia by investing heavily in
wastewater treatment, eventually leading to better water quality than today.
WATER SCARCITY IN THE ZAMBEZI BASIN 197
Within the individualist world-view water scarcity is
defined as the ratio of consumptive water use to water
availability, the latter assumed to equal total runoff. Using
these definitions, water scarcity in the Zambezi basin will
grow from 1 per cent in 1990 to 10 per cent in 2050. The
costs of water supply will grow at the same rate as in the
hierarchist utopia (Fig. 6). Water quality improvements will
suppress the growth in water supply costs in the period
2030–2050 to some extent, due to decreasing costs of water
purification. In the period 2000–2025 a market-pricing
policy will be introduced, which means that water tariffs will
increase towards 100 per cent of actual costs, including both
depreciation costs and operational and maintenance costs. In
absolute terms, expenditure in the water sector in the
individualist utopia will be much larger than in the
hierarchist or egalitarian utopias, but they will be lower if
expressed as a fraction of gross basin product (about 12% in
2050).
The effects of increasing water use throughout the basin
will be most noticeable in the downstream parts of the basin,
where all effects accumulate. Figure 8 shows how upstream
water consumption affects river runoff from the Middle and
Lower Zambezi basins. Because the outflow from Lake
Kariba is regulated by man, minimum river runoff from the
Middle Zambezi basin will not change, but the effects will
become visible in the size of peak flows. In the case of the
Lower Zambezi basin, however, there will also be significant
effects on the minimum river runoff (a reduction of 12 per
cent in the period 1990–2050). The individual effect of water
export is shown by presenting the resulting hydrographs if
there were no water export. Increased water consumption in
the Zambezi basin will influence hydropower generation at
both the existing hydropower plants and the plants yet to be
constructed. The annual outflow from Lake Kariba in the
year 2050 will be 17 per cent lower than the current outflow.
If there is no spillage, as occurred in the 1980s, any reduction
in outflow will lead to a comparable reduction in electrical
output. In relatively wet years, when spillage is not nil,
intelligent operation of the reservoir can diminish the effect
of upstream water consumption on hydropower generation to
some extent (by reducing the spill flow), but in dry years any
reduction in reservoir outflow can be linearly translated
into a reduction in electricity generation. The generation
potential of the existing hydropower plants at Lake Cahora
Bassa will barely if at all be affected because there is an
installed capacity of only 2075 MW, which is far below the
potential of the lake. According to SADCC [26], the dis-
charge at maximum electrical output of the existing plants
is about 5.91012 kg=month. As can be seen in Figure 8, this
flow is available throughout the year, not only now but also
in the year 2050. This means that, in an average year,
increased water consumption will not affect hydropower
Fig. 8. Changes in the hydrographs for the Middle and Lower Zambezi basins in the individualist utopia. The effect of water export to
South Africa is shown by presenting hydrographs for both the case with export and the case without export.
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generation at the existing plants of Cahora Bassa. Only in
dry years and in the case of ineffective operation of the
reservoir, might upstream water consumption reduce
hydropower generation at the existing plants. However, in
the individualist utopia the total installed hydropower
generation capacity at Cahora Bassa will be extended by
another 550 MW, requiring an extra flow of about
1.61012 kg=month, which is not available in every month.
As a result of increased water consumption in the period
1990–2050, the utilisation fraction will be 3.5 per cent less in
an average year; the effect will be smaller in wet years and
greater in dry years. Another plan to be carried out in the
individualist utopia is the construction of a dam and
hydropower plant at Batoka Gorge, just downstream of
Victoria Falls. The capacity of this plant will be 1600 MW, to
be shared between Zambia and Zimbabwe [33]. The Batoka
installation will be a run-of-river plant without monthly
storage, thus not influencing regional evaporation or river
runoff patterns. Complete use of the installed hydropower
generation capacity requires a flow of about 1120 m3=s,
which is far from available during dry months. The reason
for installing a capacity of 1600 MW is the benefit that can
be obtained from conjunctive use of the Batoka and Kariba
plants. The Batoka plant can make full use of the high
natural flows during the wet months while Kariba can run at
reduced capacity and store the incoming water [26]. Due to
the instream character of the Batoka plant, a reduction in
river runoff as a result of upstream water consumption will
also reduce hydropower generation. For this reason hydro-
power generation at Batoka Gorge in the individualist utopia
will in 2050 be about 7 per cent lower than it could be today
(utilisation fraction of 77 per cent instead of 83 per cent).
Due to the enlarged regulatory power in the basin, the
frequency of flooding events is expected to decrease.
4.4. Increasing Vulnerability to Drought
Given the growing demand for water under all utopias, it is
clear that the effects of droughts will become increasingly
severe. The regions most in danger are the upstream areas
that lack external water sources. This is the case already
today, but the effects of droughts will become much more
serious. This is illustrated in Figure 9, which shows the
sensitivity of water scarcity to climatic variation in three
different regions in 2050. The data refer to the hierarchist
utopia, which is more affected in this respect than the other
utopias. Figure 9 has been based on experiments with
drought periods of five years. The effect of droughts on water
scarcity will be more severe if the drought periods were
longer. In the context of global climate change, such a
scenario should not be ignored.
5. DYSTOPIAS AND RISKS
Each of the three water utopias discussed in the previous
section can be regarded as a ‘best possible future’ according
to a particular perspective. As illustrated in the previous
section, these ‘best possible futures’ are not ideal worlds, in
which no trade-offs would take place between different
 
 
Fig. 9. Sensitivity of water scarcity to climatic variation in the year 2050.
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sectors or between upstream and downstream development.
Such trade-offs are unavoidable in any possible future. Each
utopia is preferable from a particular point of view, but none
of the utopias can be called more desirable from an objective
standpoint. This section will discuss several types of future
which are not preferable from any particular perspective, but
which will emerge if disparate elements from the three
utopias are combined or if the fatalist management style is
applied. These dystopian futures show what risks are
attached to the three utopias.
First, it will be examined what happens in each of the
three utopias if the fatalist management style is applied
instead of the utopian management style. Secondly, it will be
shown what happens in the utopias if there are external
constraints on the amount of investment in the water sector.
This may be the case if no development aid is provided to
support the investment needed or if there is lack of political
support within the region. Finally a type of dystopian future
will be discussed which appears to be the most catastrophic
of all possible futures: the hierarchist or egalitarian utopia
confronted by rapid growth.
The first risk is that policy does not develop according to
the utopian management style. In general, the fatalist
management style appears to work least well in all utopias.
The principal characteristic of this management style is that
no new water policy measures are implemented and that
current practice remains more or less unchanged. Applying
the fatalist management style in the hierarchist or the
egalitarian utopia is most catastrophic in the following
fields: public water supply, sanitation, and water quality. In
addition, there will be no improvement in water-use
efficiency, which means that more water is withdrawn for
the same purposes. However, in the hierarchist dystopia total
water withdrawal by the year 2050 will be less than in the
hierarchist utopia, due to the absence of water export to
South Africa. The water scarcity situation in the hierarchist
and egalitarian dystopias will not differ greatly from that in
the respective utopias. The increase in water costs will be of
the same order of magnitude, but prices will be kept low
(Fig. 6). Expenditure for irrigation, livestock water supply
and industrial water supply will be higher than in the utopias,
due to inefficient water use. Expenditure in public water
supply, sanitation and wastewater treatment will be lower,
resulting in a sharp decline in public water supply, sanitation
and wastewater treatment coverage. Applying the fatalist
management style in the individualist utopia has rather
different consequences to applying it in the hierarchist or
egalitarian utopias. Within the individualist world-view
improvements in water supply and sanitation conditions
depend on economic growth, and not the other way round as
in the hierarchist and egalitarian world-views. As a result,
the fatalist management style will not lessen the increase in
public water supply and sanitation coverage. Also, water
quality will improve as a result of increasing wastewater
treatment coverage. The greatest problem in the individualist
dystopia is inefficient water use, resulting in a total water
withdrawal that is nearly 25 per cent larger than in the
individualist utopia and total expenditure for water supply
which is nearly 50 per cent higher.
A second risk is a lack of investment capacity. In each of
the three utopias, total expenditure in the water sector
increases considerably, even if expressed as a fraction of
gross basin product. It is questionable whether expenditure
exceeding 10 per cent of gross basin product is still realistic.
In the formulation of the utopias, it was assumed that
possible bottlenecks in the financing of future development
projects would be solved by external support from donor
countries. This is not necessarily unrealistic: development
assistance to the Zambezi basin states in 1991 varied
between 5 and 70 per cent of the gross national products of
these states [34]. However, what would happen if a
constraint is put on investment through either a lack of
development aid or a lack of political support within the
region? I will only look at constraints on the expenditure for
public water supply, sanitation and irrigation, because the
other items of expenditure never exceed 1.5 per cent of gross
basin product and in most cases are much less. Of the three
utopias, the hierarchist is most vulnerable if constraints are
applied to the expenditure for public water supply. This can
be understood by the fact that public water supply is
relatively expensive in the hierarchist utopia: population
growth is moderate, but investment capacity is moderate also
and improvements in water-use efficiency are relatively
small (compared to the egalitarian or individualist utopias).
If in the hierarchist utopia expenditure for public water
supply in each basin country is limited to 5 per cent of gross
national product, the public water supply coverage in the
basin would be only 61 per cent in 2050, instead of 100 per
cent. The egalitarian utopia is most vulnerable if constraints
are put on sanitation expenditure. This is caused by the fact
that the egalitarian utopia has an ambitious target in respect
of sanitation improvements, combined with a low investment
capacity. Application of a ‘5 per cent of GNP’ constraint on
sanitation expenditure in all basin countries results in
sanitation coverage in the basin of 69 instead of 100
per cent. The individualist utopia is most vulnerable to
constraints on irrigation expenditure. This can be explained
by the fact that the individualist utopia has by far the most
ambitious programme of irrigation development, requiring
relatively high investment. If irrigation expenditure in each
country is limited to 5 per cent of gross national product, the
irrigated cropland area in the Zambezi basin in 2050 will be
22 per cent smaller than without this constraint. The main
reduction will be in Mozambique, where current irrigation
expenditure already exceeds 5 per cent of gross national
product.
The final risk to be considered here is the confrontation of
the egalitarian or hierarchist utopia with high population
growth and rapid economic development (the individualist
context). In both utopias, rapid growth will be disastrous. In
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the egalitarian utopia total water withdrawal in the Zambezi
basin would increase towards a level of 211012 kg=yr by
the year 2050, entirely for use within the basin (there is no
water export). This is more than three times the level in the
egalitarian utopia. Water scarcity in the basin as a whole will
then grow to 44 per cent in 2050 (compared to 13 per cent in
the utopia) and the costs of water supply will increase to an
average of nearly 1 US$=m3. Expenditure in the water sector
will reach nearly a quarter of gross basin product. The
situation will be worst in the parts of the basin in Malawi
(scarcity at 92 per cent) and Zambia (scarcity at 56 per cent).
In the hierarchist utopia rapid growth will have an effect
which is even worse than in the egalitarian utopia, due to the
lack of a water-pricing system which would discourage
inefficient water use.
6. THE HARARE PRIORITIES:
A RISK ASSESSMENT
In November 1996, a workshop on the Zambezi basin was
held in Harare. The participants were mainly regional water
experts. The aim of the workshop was to explore possible
water futures and to develop promising water policy
strategies for the region [35]. The participants were
confronted with the same kind of analytical results as have
been presented in the previous sections. At the end of the
workshop, the participants were asked to translate their
insights into policy priorities on empty ‘priority sheets.’ For
this purpose they were grouped according to their home
country. Table 5 presents the policy priorities proposed by
the participants. The priorities have no formal status; they
just are the outcome of a one-time policy exercise. Here I
will interpret the results of this exercise and discuss what
risks will typically emerge if the policy priorities proposed
by the participants of the workshop were to be put into
practice.
The most striking result is that all participants were very
explicit in giving first priority to water supply policy and
second priority to water demand policy. Apart from the fact
that the participants disapproved of the idea of water export
to South Africa, their approach typically fits within the
hierarchist perspective, which is an indication that the
hierarchist view on water is dominant in the basin at present.
Although the results of the workshop are far from sufficient to
draw a final conclusion on this subject, suppose that the future
management of the Zambezi basin will resemble the
hierarchist management style, although excluding water
export to South Africa. The way in which this type of
management will work in the next few decades depends
strongly on external factors such as population growth and
economic development and on the rules according to which
matters within the Zambezi basin will proceed (i.e., according
to which world-view). By varying the conditions, I arrive at
the nine different scenarios shown in Table 6. Looking at the
criteria of water scarcity, water costs and vulnerability to
drought, the Harare priorities will work most favourably if
operated under low growth conditions in a world which
functions according to the hierarchist world-view. Under
medium growth conditions the Harare priorities can also
support socio-economic development effectively, although
the trade-off now is a rather high vulnerability to drought
Table 5. Policy priorities proposed by the participants of the workshop in Harare [36].
Policy Namibiaa Zambiaa,b Zimbabwea,b Tanzaniaa Malawia Mozambiquea
General
Water demand policy 25 20! 40 20! 30 2 þ þ
Water supply policy 75 80! 60 80! 70 1 þþ þþ
Water demand policy
Water pricing (removing subsidies) 33 60! 25 10! 10 2 þþþþ þþþþ
Water-use efficiency 33 25! 40 5! 10 1 þþþ þþþ
Water education 33 15! 35 5! 10 3 þþ þþ
Water export 0 0! 0 0! 0 4 0 
Water supply policy
Infrastructure policy 60 60! 50 70! 50 1 þþþþ þþþþ
Public water supply 40! 20 30! 20 1 þþþ þþþ
Sanitation 10! 20 10! 10 1 þ þ
Irrigation 10! 10 30! 20 1 þþþ þþþ
Water quality policy 20 20! 30 5! 10 3 þþ þþ
Land and soil policy 20 15! 15 5! 10 2 þþþ þþ
Climate policy 0 5! 5 0! 0 4 0 0
Note. aEach country used its own method of presenting the priorities. Namibia, Zambia and Zimbabwe used a priority scale from 0 (low) to
100 (high); Tanzania ranked the priorities from 1 (high!) to 4 (low!); Malawi and Mozambique used a scale from 0 (low) to þþþþ
(high). Figures for Angola and Botswana are not available because there were no participants from these countries.
bWhereas the other country participants did not respond to the request to distinguish between past or present and future priorities, the
participants from Zambia and Zimbabwe did, resulting in the trends as indicated by arrows.
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(comparable to the vulnerability to drought in the hierarchist
utopia; see Section 4.4). Apart from the vulnerability to
drought, application of the Harare priorities will carry two
further risks. One of these is that water use will be inefficient,
resulting in higher water demand and greater pressure on the
water system than is necessary. This occurs if the world does
not function according to the hierarchist, but according to the
egalitarian or the individualist world-view. The other risk is
that water supply will fall short while investment capacity is
not large enough to further extend supply infrastructure. This
happens if the world functions according to the hierarchist or
the egalitarian world-view under high growth conditions. In
these two scenarios, water expenditure would have to grow to
about 25 per cent of gross basin product in order to supply the
water demanded. As can be seen from Table 6, these two
scenarios are the worst developments that could occur within
the Zambezi basin if the Harare priorities were to be put into
practice.
Let us presuppose that future growth in the Zambezi basin
might be low, medium, or high, and that the three world-
views are equally sound. In this case, one can say that proper
application of the Harare priorities roughly carries the
following odds. There is a chance of 1 in 9 that socio-
economic development will be supported effectively without
the necessity for trade-offs; a chance of 6 in 9 that socio-
economic development will be supported effectively with
relatively inefficient water use or a rather high vulnerability
to drought, or both, as trade-off; and a chance of 2 in 9 that
application of the Harare priorities will be ineffective. In the
last case, water supply will fall short and expenditure in the
water sector will become extraordinarily high. This would
occur under high growth conditions, and would be a reason
to be alert if application of the Harare or similar priorities
were combined with rapid population growth and economic
development.
7. CONCLUSION
Different mechanisms have been identified which could
become important in the basin’s future: the mechanism of
rapid growth, the mechanism of balancing the desirable and
the possible, and the mechanism of stabilisation. Each
mechanism is preferable from a particular point of view. It
has been shown that these mechanisms can interfere with
each other, resulting in less desirable futures. These less
desirable futures can be regarded as risks attached to the
more desirable futures. This has been analysed by regarding
Table 6. What will happen – under different conditions – if the ‘Harare priorities’ are put into practice?
Hierarchist context (medium growth) Egalitarian context (low growth) Individualist context (high growth)
Hierarchist
world-view
Water demand increases by a
factor of 6 to 7 in the period
1990–2050. Total water demand
per capita grows by about 50%.
Water scarcity grows from 2% to
12%. Average water costs per litre
increase by about 60%. Water
policy adequately supports
continued economic growth,
but the trade-off is a rather
high vulnerability to drought.
The increase in water demand is
relatively modest and can be
satisfied without major problems.
Water scarcity and water costs
increase less than in the case of
medium growth. Vulnerability to
drought is relatively low. Water
problems do not impede socio-
economic development. Water
policy appears to be effective.
Water demand increases relatively
fast. The emphasis on supply
policy appears to be inadequate.
Water supply will fall short.
Investment to further extend
supply infrastructure cannot
be afforded. Vulnerability
to drought becomes very high.
Strong demand policy is needed.
Egalitarian
world-view
Water demand, water scarcity
and water costs increase by about
the same percentages as in the
scenario above. Water policy
adequately supports continued
economic growth, but the trade-off
is a rather high vulnerability to
drought. Furthermore, a lack of an
appropriate pricing policy results in
waste of water.
Lack of an appropriate pricing
policy, resulting in waste of water.
However, water scarcity and water
costs remain relatively low, due
to a relatively small increase
in water demand. Water demand
can be supplied without major
problems. Vulnerability to
drought is relatively low.
Water demand increases relatively
fast. The emphasis on supply
policy appears to be inadequate.
Water supply will fall short.
Investment to further extend
supply infrastructure cannot be
afforded. Vulnerability to drought
becomes very high. Strong demand
policy is needed.
Individualist
world-view
Lack of an appropriate pricing policy,
resulting in inefficient water use.
Despite the fact that water demand
increases by a factor of 5, water
scarcity and water costs remain
relatively low, due to high water
availability.
Lack of an appropriate pricing
policy, resulting in inefficient
water use. However, water scarcity
and water costs remain relatively
low, due to a relatively low
increase in water demand
and high water availability.
Lack of an appropriate pricing
policy, resulting in inefficient
water use. Despite the rapid
increase in water demand, water
scarcity and water costs
do not increase greatly, due
to high water availability.
Note. The ‘Harare priorities’ have been translated into the model by assuming the hierarchist management style, but excluding water export
to South Africa.
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‘dystopias’ as derivations of the three ‘utopias.’ A major risk
in both the hierarchist and the egalitarian utopia is that
public water supply, sanitation and wastewater treatment fail
to improve, as a result of either mismanagement or a lack of
investment capacity. Furthermore, both utopias are vulner-
able to high growth conditions, which can lead to absolute
water scarcity conditions in several parts of the basin. The
main risk to the individualist utopia is inefficient water-use
and extraordinarily high expenditure for water supply, which
can result from a price policy that does not conform to the
market.
As concluded in Section 4 all utopias are vulnerable to
drought. Although future droughts can to a large extent be
regarded as unavoidable, their effects will depend on the
type of development path that is followed. Independent of
the world-view applied, the effects will be greater under high
growth than under low growth conditions. Minimising the
vulnerability to drought will therefore require low growth. In
this respect, the egalitarian context is less perilous than the
hierarchist context, which, in turn is less risky than the
individualist context. Growing competition between water
users can become really fierce during a succession of dry
years. For this reason, droughts constitute an opportunity for
latent risks to become manifest. In this sense, droughts are a
kind of early warning system. If a period of relatively wet
years follows a disastrous period of drought, problems may
seem to be solved, but they will probably return in a more
severe form during the next series of dry years.
The question of which type of management increases the
effects of future droughts and which reduces the effects is
slightly more complex. The only advantage of the fatalist
management style in this respect is the absence of water
export to South Africa, because water export heightens the
vulnerability to droughts considerably. On the other hand
however, the fatalist management style lacks elements that
improve water-use efficiency and it thus increases demand
and vulnerability to droughts. In addition, the fatalist
management style introduces other types of risk, related
for instance to public health and water quality. The
hierarchist management style focuses strongly on increasing
water supply (through dams, supply infrastructure) rather
than on reducing demand, which will result in relatively high
specific water demands and an increase in society’s
vulnerability to drought. In this respect, the egalitarian and
individualist management styles have the advantage of
changing pricing structures more radically, thus reducing
demands, which makes these types of management prefer-
able to the hierarchist management style. With regard to the
effects of droughts, the main disadvantage of the individu-
alist management style is the export of water from the basin
to South Africa. From the above, it can be concluded that the
egalitarian context in combination with the egalitarian
management style will reduce the vulnerability to drought
most effectively. This would mean: low growth, no water
export to South Africa and strong efforts to increase water-
use efficiency through improving water-pricing structures
and ‘water education.’
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